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1.  Introduction 
The typical forward-looking variable in an economist's model is driven by an exogenous forcing 
process whose form is fixed for all time.  Yet in the real world, there are many examples in which 
the forcing process is subject to change once a certain event occurs. When variables such as interest 
rates, current accounts, inflation or exchange rates reach extreme values, authorities may not only 
change their policies — they  may also change their policy reaction functions. 
A number of papers  examine the behavior of forward-looking variables when an otherwise 
passive policy maker intervenes to keep  the variables from moving out of a predetermined range. 
In this spirit, Krugman  (1988a) and Miller and  Weller  (1988) study  exchange rate target zones, 
and Dixit (1988, 1987), Dumas (1988) and Krugman (1988b) study the allocation of capital.  In 
all these models, the authority  acts in a way to keep  the forward-looking variable within a desired 
range or band.  These papers  also share a useful technical approach to these problems, that of 
regulated Brownian motion, which often gives simple and intuitive answers. 
A related literature  studies the effects on forward-looking variables of once-and-for-all  changes 
in regime.  Flood and Garber  (1983), for example, study a case in which the exchange rate floats 
freely until it reaches a pre-announced level, at which time the government intervenes to keep the 
exchange rate (Ixed thereafter.  Because rational  investors anticipate the  transition to the peg, the 
level and dynamics of the rate will be  different than under a permanent float. Flood and Garber (1983) apply a first-stopping-time methodology to this regicoe-switcliing  problem.  Unfortunately, 
they are  uoable to derive a closed-form  solution using that noatheinatically cumbersome approach. 
In this paper we apply techniques of regulated lirowniao motion to (i) clarify the relationship 
between the newer target-zone results nf Krugman (1988a) and Miller and Weller (1988), and the 
process-switching  model of Flood and Garber (1983); aod (ii) present simple and intuitive results to 
a number of interesting cases in stochastic process switching including the one posed (but not solved 
in closed  form) by Flood and Garher  (1983).  In section 2 below, we lay out the general exchange 
rate model. Section 3 contains the solutions to several specific  process-switching examples. Section 
4 concludes. 
2.  The Model 
To keep the analysis simple, we use the standard  flexible-price  monetary model of the exchange 
rate.1  In this framework, the (log) spot  exchange rate at time I, z(t), is the sum  of a set of 
macroeconomic  fundamentals, k(t), plus a speculative term  proportional to the expected percentage 
change in the exchange rate: 
x(t) = k(t) + rxE(dx(t)/dt I (t)).  (1) 
Above, the parameter  a can be interpreted as the semi-elasticity of domestic money demand with 
respect to the interest rate, E is the expectations operator, and (t) is the time-t  information set, 
which includes the current value of fundamentals, k(t), as well  as any explicit or implicit restrictions 
the authorities have placed on the future evolution of fundamentals.  (For example, the authorities 
may have announced that they intend  to keep the exchange rate from moving outside certain 
limits, or that they will fix the exchange rate once it reaches a certain level.  This information 
about future policies would be  incorporated into (t).) Included  among the fundamental factors 
that affect  k(t)  is a variahle measuring relative national money supplies, which are assumed to be 
controlled directly by monetary authorities.  Included as well are other, exogenous determinants  of 
'discussion adopt. a  osntinssus-time  approach, which allows a neater  choracteriaatioa  of the esistion, thss  compsrahle 
discrete-time methods.  No essentials of the results,  however, depend  on the oonttnooos-time assomption. 
2 exchange rates that the authorities  cannot influence.2 
The monetary  authorities  may intervene to influence exchange rates by altering  the stochastic 
process governing (relative)  money-supply  growth.  This in turn will alter the process driving the 
fundamentals,  k(t).  A regime  of freely  floating exchange rates  is said to be in effect  when the 
authorities  refrain from intervening  to offset shocks to fundamentals.  Under a  free float,  we assume 
the fundamentals  to evolve according to the process: 
dk(t) = t7dt + cdz(t),  (2) 
where s is the (constant) expected change in k, dz is a  standard  Wiener process, and e is a constant. 
Equation  (2) is just the continuous-time  version of a random walk with  trend.3  As noted  above, 
the authorities can control k through intervention,  so k need not follow (2)  under regimes other 
than a free float. 
In a rational-expectations  equilibrium  with no speculative bubbles, there is a unique exchange- 
rate path that satisfies (1). This path has the integral  representation: 
x(t) = E(&1 j e(t_Vok(B)ds I (t)) = a1j  e(t—°)1°E(ic(s)  4(t))ds,  (3) 
the monetary  modei of exchange rate.,  see, for example,  Frenkei  (1978) sod Muosa  (1978). The model  consists  of four 
equations.  First,  there  is a domestic  money  demand  equation  for the country we study 
— p(t) =  °o +  cnjy(t) 
— oi(t) + c(l),  aix>  0,  (i) 
where x  ii the log of the domestic  money  .upply, p is the log of the domestic  price level, v is the log of reo.l income, i is the 
nomine.l interest rate, snd v isa random money-demand  shock. Money  demand  by the rest of the world is given by 
— p(i) w  wo + 'siV  (t) 
— si(i) + r(t),  (is) 
where  the asterisks  denote  the rest.of-ths..world  counterpart. to the variable,  in (1).  The model  assumes that  purchasing  power 
parity hold, up to an exogenously  ve.rying reel exchange  rate .hock g, so the log of the nominal exchange rate, s, is 
s(t) =  p(t) 
— p(t)  + q(t).  (iii) 
The model also assumes that domestic  and foreign asset. See perfect substitute, up to as, esogenously  varying risk premium 
on domestic-cuerency  assets,  p.  Expected depreciation i, thus the sum of the nominal interest-rate differential and the risk 
E(dc(t)Idl  I #(i)) =  1(t) 
— i(l)  — p(l).  (Ic) 
Subtracting (ii) from (i), and using (iii) and  (iv) give,  equation (1) in  the text with 
k(t) = ss,(V(t)  — v(t)) +  mCi)  — m(i)  + q(t) +  op(l) + c(t) 
— r(l).  (c) 
°The  propositions  belo  ran be rederivsd  using more  complex  forcing processes, such  as the mean-reverticg  procesr 
dls(l) = (,i 
— Sk(t))di + ode. 
Se Section  3.5 below. 
3 a representation valid under any policy  regime or sequence of policy  regimes. In words,  (3) equates 
the current exchange rate to the present discounted value of expected  future fundamoentats  (the 
discount  rate is 1/n).  Below, the equilibrium  exchange-rate value given by  the present-value formula 
(3) is called the exchange rate's  sadd/epath  value. 
Other solutions to (1)  exist,  of course, but these involve extraneous bubble  terms,  which  are 
driven by self-fulfilling  expectations.  In the present model, a bubble /3(t) is a  random variable that 
can be added to the saddlepath  solution in (3)  to produce  a new solution. The bubble,  j3(t), is 
expected to grow over time at rate 1/cs because  it  necessarily satisfies the homogeneous part of (1): 
1/cs = E(dfl(t)/dt 
I  (t))/fi(t). 
We sssume that sucb  bubble  solutions  are ruled  out by market  forces, so that the exchange rate is 
on the saddlepath defined by equation  (3) in equilibrium.4 
Given  (2)  and the types of regime changes  we will consider, it is reasonable to suppose that 
the saddlepath solution  for the exchange rate can be written as a twice continuously  differentiable 
function of a single variable,  the current  fundamental: 
z(t) = S(k(t)).  (4) 
Naturally, the precise form of the function  5(k) depends (as is demonstrated below)  on the types  of 
regime shifts (if  any) that the market  thinks are possible.5 A well-known  special case is the one in 
which  the authorities  are committed  to a permanent  exchange-rate float,  so that fundamentals  are 
expected to follow  process (2) forever.  In this case, the conditional  expectations in (3)  are easy to 
evaluate, since they depend exclusively on current fundamentals,  and not on possible future regime 
shifts: 
z(t) = S(k(t)) 
4A deep issue  set aside here  is whether the eaddlepath  solution is the unique equilihrism solstion in the absenee at some 
gsvemnment  contingency  plas tsr intervening in ease of an extreme  deviation between  the exehange  rate asd its saddlepath 
level.  The analysis in Ohstteld aed ftsgsff  (1983)  suggests  a  eegative  answer.  Such  contingent istervention aerangementa 
would, hswever, have exchange-rate  effects  similar to those  of the target-eanas  analysed helsw.  In  particular, the relevant 
saddlepath  would hecetne nsnlinear. 
5w5  witl show  later  that  C(s) is meeslenically increasing  in kin the asses analysed  in this paper. 
4 = co jso  e0'°E(k(s)  I  k(t))ds = a  e°(k(i)  + (s 
— t)ei)ds = k(t) + on.  (5) 
If, however, the market  expects the authorities  to intervene iii the fut.urc,  fundaineiitals  will 
not always follow (2), so the exchange rate will not follow  (5), even while floating freely.  In such 
cases,  direct computation  of the sequence of conditional  expectations  in the present-value  formula 
(3) that defines S(k) is likely to be burdensome.  We therefore  follow  an  alternative, two-step 
approach to determine S(k) when a regime switch from (2) to some other process is possible. First, 
we characterize the family of functions  of form z = G(k) that satisfy  the equilibrium condition 
(1) so long  as fundamentals  evolve according  to (2).  Second, we find  the member of this family 
that satisfies boundary  conditions  appropriate  to the stochastic regime switch  under consideration. 
This last function is the saddlepath  solution,  S(k). 
A  more detailed justification for this two-step  procedure is offered in context below.  The 
method  is, however, analogous to one commonly used  for diagrammajically  analyzing  a one-time 
step change in fundamentals in deterministic  asset-price models. In those models, one first observes 
that before the disturbance  occurs, the asset price is given by some member of  the class of general 
solutions  to the differential equation  defining  asset-market  equilibrium.  (This general solution 
corresponds to the solution G(k) mentioned  in the previous  paragraph.)  Next, one pins  down 
the economically relevant pre-disturbance solution, which generally differs  from the saddlepath,  by 
two boundary  conditions:  one of these forces the asset price to be  continuous at the moment  the 
disturbance  occurs, and the other  forces the asset price to be on the saddlepath  afterward.° 
To implement  step one of the procedure outlined  above  — finding  the general solution  z  G(k) 
— use Ito's lemma and equation  (1) to express expected depreciation  during the float as:7 
E(dz/dt I  = E(dG(k)/dt  = ,1G'(k) + -G"(k),  (6) 
where we have assumed G(k) is twice  continuously  differentiable.  Combining  (1)  and (6) yields  a 
'For  an exposition,  see Obstfeld and Stockman  (1985). 
'Where  it doe, not create  confosion,  xc drop the  time-dependence  notation. It is worth noting that  while we refer to  C(k) 
a  gener.1  solution, it i.  general  only if  attontion I.  restricted to solution, that depend  on current fundamentxl, alone.  In 
fed, (1) ha. even more  general  solution., for  example,  solution. that are  function, not only of current fundamentals,  but also 
of  v.ri.b1  extraneous  to the model. Such  solutioss,  di,cus,ed by Froot and Obatfeld  (1988),  er. not con.idered  in this paper. 
5 second-order differential  equation that the exchange rate in (I)  arid (3) must satisfy: 
G(k) = k +  aqG'(k) + G"(k).  (7) 
The general solution  to (7)  is: 
C(k) = .k + aq + A5e + A2e)2h,  (8) 
where A1 > 0 and A2 < 0 are the roots to the qnadratic  equation  in A, 
+ Aceq — 1 =  0,  (9) 
and At,  A2  are constants  of integration.8 Equation (8)  forms  the basis of our analysis below; as 
just discussed, a single member of the family that  (8) defines will turn out to be equivalent to the 
present-discounted-value  formula  for x in (3).  This is just the function S(k). 
Notice that there are  two parts  to the general solution  (8): one linear,  and the other nonlinear, 
in k. The linear  portion, k + arj, would he the standard  linear saddlepath solution if no change 
in the fundamentals  process (2) were possible, so that a free float were permanently  in effect (see 
equation  (5)).  This part of the solution would  be expected  to grow linearly with time under  a 
permanent  free float. 
The nonlinear part of (8)  defines additional  solutions  to  (1), all of which  depend  only on 
current fundamentals.  When  the market expects the exchange rate to float  freely forever,  these 
solutions  can  be viewed as bubble  paths,  since along them, the exchange rate differs  from the 
present discounted value of expected future fundamentals, k + aq. The nonlinear term in (8), like 
any other bubble, is expected to grow exponentially at  the rate 1/a if  a switch  from the free-float 
regime  is a probability-sero  event.  To see why,  consider how the term A5eMt  in (8)  affects  the 
exchange rate's behavior.  Under a permanent free float, the time-t expected value of this term at 
time r >  relative to its value at t is: 
I  (t))  E(eAtT_iA10f(e) 
I  k(t)) 
= eAt  r_l)e  a'frtl/2  (10) 
tFor a  dinosoiton  of the teohniqun used to solve  olonely related  eoaooples,  see Oioit (isss). Equation (5) 000  ho shown to 
he the unique  general  notation to (l  using the method  of Wronkeian  dotorminonto,  providod that  At  A nod a  ie Snito. Notice that (10) is the product  of two components. 'l'lie first component,  grows with r at. 
a rate  dependent on the deterministic  trend growth rate of fundamentals, v; the second component, 
e""  grows with  r because of the uncertainty in the growth in fundamentals,  measured by 
If  k were a completely  deterministic process, with a = 0, then from (9),  = 1/or,', and the 
second component  of (10)  would remain  constant  at  1  forever.  Under these circumstances,  it is 
easy to see that (10) would grow at rate 1/cs, the rate  at which the conditional  means of  all bubble 
solutions  to (1)  grow.  When o > 0, however, (10)  still must  grow at rate 1/cs (because )' is a 
root of the quadratic  equation  (9)); but if a > 0, then  A1 < 1/csii.  This implies that the variance 
of fundamentals  (through Jensen's inequality)  contribute more and  the deterministic  growth of 
fundamentals  contributes  less to the overall growth  rate of (10).  The  same reasoning applies to the 
second nonlinear  term in (8). 
Although the nonlinear  terms in (8) can be viewed as defining  bubble solutions to (1) under a 
permanent  free float, we do not want  to throw them  away in  solving for  the saddlepath exchange rate 
under a  free float that could  terminate. When there is some type of  regime-switching,  fundamentals 
may not remain  permanently  a random walk,  and the present-value formula  (3)  therefore  is not 
equal to the simple linear expression (5).  Under the possibility  of a regime switch,  the exchange 
rate'a saddlepath value prior to the switch  will necessarily depend on the nonlinear  term in (8). Just 
which initial  conditions  A1 and A2 are appropriate  depends on the boundary  conditions  associated 
with the regime switch,  conditions to be determined  in step two of the two-step solution  procedure 
outlined above. 
Before  proceeding to this second step -in the next  section, however, we introduce a diagram 
that will aid in visualizing  the various boundary  conditions that are  derived there.  Figure 1 shows 
the family of paths given by (8) for the symmetric  case in which A1 = —A2, and where ii > 0. On 
the horizontal  axis is the value of the fundamental,  Ic, and on the vertical  axis is the value of the 
exchange rate, x. The  line  labelled FF indicates the linear solution given by (5), which corresponds 
to the case Aj = A2 = 0.  (FF is  also the saddlepath under a permanent  free-float  regime. It has 
a 45-degree slope and passes through the point Ic =  0, z = csm.) As described above, the curvature 
7 of  each path is supported  by the expected growth rate of fundamentals and Jensen's inequality. 
The apparent  asymmetry in the paths reflects  the trend in the growth of fundamentals,  ej:  as k 
increases, the paths converge more quickly toward the saddlepatli and diverge more slowly  away 
from it than they would in the symmetric case without trend growth, tj 
— o. 
3. Examples 
This section carries out the second step of the solution method outlined in section 2.  The dis- 
cussion takes up sequentially the boundary conditions implied by several  possible regime-switching 
scenarios.  In terms of the mathematics,  all that is involved is the appropriate choice of the two 
arbitrary constants in (8), A1 and A2.  A key implication of the discussion is that the same unifying 
principle leads to solutions for all of  the problems considered. 
3.1. Exchange Rate Target Zones 
Suppose the authorities want to keep the exchange rate from penetrating the upper and lower 
levels, x and  E.  When the exchange rate reaches one of these boundaries,  the authorities  do to 
fundamentals what is necessary to keep  x from moving outside of its target zone.  However, they 
do not prevent a  movement of z back into the interior of the zone. Exchange-rate behavior within 
a target zone wss studied originally by Krugman (1988a), whose analysis has been extended by 
Miller and Weller (1988). 
One way for  the authorities to enforce the target  zone is to place lower and upper limits, k and 
on the fundamentals.  If the fundamentals are prevented from moving outside the range [k, 1, 
and if (as turns out to be true in equilibrium) S(k) is monotonically increasing in k, the exchange 
rate  will be confined  between the lower and upper values g = S(k) and i  = S(). (As usual, S(k) 
is the saddlepath  value  of the exchange rate within the target zone.) For the exchange rate to be 
free to move back within the zone  after it has touched one of its edges, the bounds  1k' 1 must  be 
reflecting barriers on the fundamentals  process.  Clearly, the authorities can enforce any desired 
exchange-rate target zone by choosing appropriate reflecting barriers on the fundamentals. 
5Fsr present purposes,  it does nst matter whether  it is the home or foreign government  thet masuges  the eachasge  rate 
lsr a  committee represasting  both governmental.  The term "aothoritief shoold be understood  as eocompuaiog  all of these 
possible controllers. Before solving  the model under the arrangements just described, it is worth considering just 
how the authorities'  policy should be conveyed to the market.  One possibility  is that the authorities 
announce, "We  will let the exchange rate  float freely within the range [, ],  but when it roaches  the 
band's edge we will intervene to keep it from going further." While this may be  the most intuitive 
way to announce an exchange-rate target  zone, it introduces a potential for multiple  equilibria by 
not giving  market participants  enough information  about the future behavior of fundamentals.  For 
example, at the moment the authorities  first announce  that the exchange rate  will be confined within 
bands, the market could set x =  if the authorities  respond by setting k = k immediately.  An 
initial exchange rate of  is an equilibrium  when k =  provided the authorities  subsequently allow 
k to move downward  according  to (2), but not upward.  Similar reasoning, but based on different 
market  anticipations  about the management of fundamentals,  shows that an initial exchange rate 
of z =  could also occur.  The point is that multiple  values of z can  be supported  as equilibria 
through accommodating  adjustments of the fundamentals.10 
Because announcing  exchange-rate objectives  without specifying  the accompanying  policies 
may  not be enough to determine  a unique  equilibrium exchange rate, we stay with the initial 
formulation  offered above:  Momentary  intervention  prevents fundamentals  from rising above the 
upper bound k  or below  the lower  bound ,  but  no intervention  occurs otherwise.  As  we will show in 
a moment, a policy of credibly  announcing that  and  are reflecting barriers  on the fundamentals 
accomplishes the objective of keeping the exchange  rate within the range  = S(k),  = S()]. And 
because the policy  does not allow  market  expectations to influence the evolution  of fundamentals 
inside the band,  problem  of multiple equilibria  does not arise. 
To  determine  exchange-rate behavior within a target  zone, we therefore solve for the exchange. 
rate path that satisfies (1) given fundamentals  evolving according to (2) within reflecting  barriers 
k and .  The solution  can be expressed as a  special case of (3): 
z(t) = S(k(t)) = E(a' f c('')Ik(a)ds  I  k(t),k(s) E fk,k,.J),  (11) 
where the r subscript  indicates that the barriers on fundamentals are reflecting.  As noted in  section 
Ob.tf.ld sad Stockmsn (1955,  section  3.3) for. mo,.  detisTed discussion  of misted indetemminociss. 
9 2, direct evaluation of  the conditional  expectation  in (It) is much  more difficult than in (5) (the 
case of  a permanent free float):  the bounds on fundamentals imply that the saddlepath  exchange 
rate S(k) will no longer be a purely linear function of k. 
We have already taken the first step in solving the problem by deriving the general nonlinear 
solution  x = G(k)  given by  (8).  Some member of this  family of solutions must  characterize 
exchange-rate behavior when k is in the interior of[kr,.], where (1) and (2) simultaneously hold. 
A nontrivial  logical gap must be bridged, however, before concluding that equation (8) is also 
relevant at the boundary of this interval, that is, at the barriers k = ,  and k = k,..  The needed 
bridge  is supplied by the fact that the saddlepath solution S(k) is continuous on the entire interval 
[,k,j.  Continuity ensures that if S(k) coincides with a function of  form G(k)  on the interior of 
that interval, S(k) coincides with the same function at the edges. 
All that remains, then, is to determine the boundary conditions on C(k) implied by the re- 
flecting barriers.  These conditions deliver unique values for the undetermined  coefficients A1 and 
A2 in (8), and therefore tie down uniquely the member of the class G(k)  that coincides with S(k) 
when k lies between the reflecting barriers. 
The appropriate boundary conditions on G(k) are the "smooth-pasting'  conditions discussed 
in Dixit (1987), Dumas (1988), and Krugman (1988a,b): 
G'L) = 0,  .  (12) 
G'() = 0.  (13) 
The intuition behind these conditions is straightforward, as the following  argument shows. Consider 
equation (12), for example.  If (h,., )  is an equilibrium point under the target zone,  equilibrium 
condition (1) must hold at that point.  At the boundary, however, investors have a one-sided bet 
on fundamentals.  Investors know that from k = Ic,, k can move only upward.  Suppose (contrary 
to (12)) that the function G(k) describing the saddlepath under a zone passes through  (k,, )  with 
a negative slope, that is, with G'(k,) < 0.  Point I in Figure 2 shows a function G(k) for which 
this is the case.  The inequality G'(k,.)  < 0 states that under a hypothetical free float with the 
10 exchange rate given by x = G(k), the positive-probability  event that k falls below k, would  cause 
x to rise above x. But then (k,  x)  cannot  also be  an  equilibrium  point (and thus satisfy (1)) when 
k, is  a reflecting  lower  barrier: in the latter  case,  the downside risk is exactly the same as under 
a free float  (the exchange rate can still move down along G(k) if k rises), but there is no longer 
any  upside  exchange-rate risk (from a fall in k).  A similar argument  disposes of the possibility 
that G'(k,) > 0 (imagine that point 2 in Figure 2 is vertically  below k,, and  repeat  the line of 
reasoning just presented).  The contradiction  is avoided only if  G'(k,) = 0, so that under the free 
float described by G(k), a small downward move in k from k, doesn't  affect the exchange rate.  At 
the lower  barrier, the saddlepath must  therefore look like 5(k) in the figure, that is, it  must  be at a 
local minimum. A parallel  argument  establishes the second smooth-pasting  condition (13), which 
states that the saddlepath  has a local maximum  at k," 
Using (8), we can write  the smooth-pasting  conditions  as: 
1 + A,.A1eA + A2A2e" = 0,  (14) 
1 + A,A1e"' +  A2.A2e' = 0.  (15) 
Equations  (14) and (15) yield the following  proposition:12 
Proposition 1.  When  fundamentals  follow  (2) within the reflecting  barriers  and k, the 
saddlepath  solution (11) is: 
f2flAsk+ik — A2eA5k.fk +  —  A1e  k+Ask\ 
-— 
—  ).  (16) 
.1A2es+Ak  A1A2eAsk4.i 
If we let the lower barrier, k, go to minus infinity, (16) simplifies to: 
= S(k)  k + q 
— .xj1e(k_i).  (17) 
Rarri.on (1585) contain, a formal  derivation of  the .mooth-poutng condition. Omit  (19s8) offer, a di.crete-time n,oliv.tion 
of  those result.. 
'5Kn.gman (1988a)  first derived  this result. It.  actually  assume, that  the aothontiee  announce  exchange-rate  band., and  then 
prevent movement, of the fundamental, that  would push the equilibrium proc. outside those  band.. The smooth-posting  logic 
ondorlying  his iolution  implies,  hmeever, that  the .uthoritie.  are  enforcing  a two-sided  reflecting  barriec on the fundamental.. As 
a  result, hi.  solution j,  exactly the same  a. the one given a the text. Miller  and Weller (1588),  who work with  a mee..-r.verting 
proce.., alan  assume that  the authorities anosunce  price band. and that the .mooth-pa.ting condition, hold. 
11 If iii addition we let the upper barrier, 1, go to infinity, (17) becomes the linear saddlcpatb  in 
(5): 
r=k+rstj.  (18) 
Only when both  boundaries are infinitely distant  is the exchange rate a linear function of funda- 
mentals. 
Notice that the saddlepath  solution given in (16) is of  the form hypothesized earlier: it is a 
function of the current state k and the two barriers. It is also straightforward to verify that S(k) 
is monotonically increasing over its domain of definition, as claimed earlier. 
Figure 3 illustrates  two possible exchange rate paths described by (16).  Tbe paths share a 
common upper barrier, ,  but differ with respect  to the lower barrier.  Path  1 in the figure sbows 
the behavior of the exchange rate when there are finite reflecting barriers  at k  and L This path has 
several noteworthy features. First, its  shape reflects  the influence  of expected policy changes at the 
fundamental barriers.  In the oeighborhood of Ic, for example, the exchange rate is below FF, the 
saddlepath  under a hypothetical free float. This bending away from FF near k reflects a greater 
expected fall in z  compared with a situation without boundaries. Second, the equilibrium solution 
behaves much like the saddlepatb when the exchange rate is within the band but not close to either 
boundary.  When the band  is wider, the equilibrium solution is close to FF for a greater range of 
fundamentals.  Path 2, for  example, shows the case in which the lower boundary  is infinitely distant 
(equation (17)). This graphical intuition  is made precise in (18), which shows that the equilibrium 
solution converges to the saddlepath  when both barriers are infinitely distant. The implication is 
that for a narrow band, the free-float solution FF will almost never be a good approximation  to 
the true equilibrium path. 
3.2. Dual Absorbiug  Barriers 
Suppose now that the authorities wish to let the exchange rate float until it reaches a lower 
or an upper  level, x or ,  at which time they plan to fix x permanently.  To keep the spot rate 
fixed at one of these levels, the authorities must hold the fundamentals  constant at k = 5'Lr) 
12 or k = S'(), respectively.  This class of problems  is a generalization  of that posed by Flood 
and Garber  (1983)  who are concerned with the behavior of a tloattng  exdiange  rate when  the 
authorities  plan to switch to a fixed-rate  regime  at a single, predetermined  level of  the exchange 
rate, .  We discuss the Flood  and Garber example in  more detail in the next section. 
Once again, there is the issue of how  the authorities'  intentions  are conveyed to the public. In 
order  to avoid potential multiple equilibria,  we assume that the authorities  inform investors  that 
fundamentals  will follow  (2) until k reaches k or .  At that time the authorities will  fix k, thereby 
fixing the exchange rate at  = S(/t) or  = S(k), respectively. 
Given  the boundaries, k and k, the  saddlepath solution is: 
z(i)  S(k(t)) = E(cs' f  e(°k(s)ds I  k(1),  k(s) E  ,  (19) 
where the a subscript  denotes that the barriers on fundamentals are absorbing.  As before, direct 
evaluation of (19) is very cumbersome. The methods used above apply directly,  however, and lead 
to a simple answer. 
The  first step once again is to examine the exchange  rate's value at the boundaries. Fortunately, 
the boundary  values of integral  (19) are  easy to evaluate. They  are: 
= S() = E(a' f  ()I5k(8)d8 I  k(t) =  = '  f°° e'ds  = ,  (20) 
= S() = E(' j e(t_k(a)ds I  k(t) =  = a1 f e(t'5ds  = .  (21) 
In words,  once fundamentals  are fixed permanently,  the spot rate is just the capitalized  value of 
current fundamentals,  either L  or 
At the boundaries,  (8)  and either (20) or (21) must hold.  Together they  imply: 
a' + A1e" + A2eA = 0,  (22) 
at + A1e)k + A2e = 0.  (23) 
These two equations  lead to a unique  solution  for the two constants in (8),  and to the following 
proposition: 
13 Propositioss 2.  When fundamentals follow  (2) within the ahsorhing harriers k and  k, the 
saddlepath  solution (t9) is: 
A3k+A1k  — A2ktAIk + 
— 
x=k+csq(I+  -  -  1  (24)  — 8A3k+A,k  I 
If we let the lower bound, k, go to minus infinity, (24) simplifies to: 
z = k + oq (i 
— eAI_).  (25) 
If in addition the upper bound, k, goes to infinity, we again get the familiar linear solution in (5). 
Figure  4 illustrates  equation  (24).  It shows two exchange rate paths that share the same 
upper bound,  but that have different lower  bounds.  Path  1 shows the behavior of a when the 
absorbing barriers are tbe points k and  in the figure.  Path 2 is drawn to correspond to the 
extreme case in (25), where the lower bound is at minus infinity.  It is clear from the figure, as 
well as from (18), that the exchange rate must  lie on the 45-degree line through the origin at both 
absorbing barriers.  When both boundaries are infinitely distant,  the saddlepath is  just  the free-float 
saddlepatb, FF. Notice also from the proposition that if there is no trend growth in fundamentals, 
= 0, all solutions correspond to the 45-degree line (which then coincides with FF), regardless of 
the boundary  values. 
The intuition behind the saddlepath solution in Figure 4 is as follows.  On the saddlepatb, the 
exchange rate is the present discounted value of fundamentals, and the evolution of fundamentals is 
governed in part by their deterministic trend growth rate, which depends on q. Suppose that q > ll 
(the case shown in the figure). As k approaches either  or k, the probability that the exchange 
rate will still be floating on any given future date declines; and since mj  is set permanently to zero 
at the moment of pegging, the expected rate of monetary growth on any future date also declines 
as either absorbing barrier is approached. As a result, there is a progressive currency appreciation 
relative to EF as k moves  towards one of the barriers. For q < 0, FF  would lie below the 45-degree 
line and the saddlepath  solution would be  the mirror image of the one in Figure 4.  When  mj = 0 
the bending effects are absent because absorption of I has no effect  on the expected change in 
14 fundamentals  (which  remains zero).  'l'hink of the saddlepath  as being  trapped  between FF and 
the 45-degree line, which,  as noted in the last paragraph, coincide when q = 0. 
3.3. Single Barrier Problems 
The path given by (25) has additional significance  in the exchange rate literature:  it is the 
unique path for the stochastic-process-switching  problem  posed by Flood and Garber (1983). Flood 
and Garber  attempt to solve directly the integral representation for the exchange rate under a single 
absorbing barrier at k: 
x(t) = E(cr' f e(t_0k(s)ds I  k(t), k(s) < ,).  (26) 
Since they do not arrive at a  closed-form  solution, it is worth some additional discussion to see why 
the simple formula (25) is the solution to this problem. 
With a single absorbing barrier at k, we know from (8) and (21) that the exchange rate must 
satisfy: 
= k + ati(1 
—  + Az(e2k 
— ee—fAk),  (27) 
where A2 is an arbitrary  constant to be determined.  Clearly, there will be a unique value for A2 
which makes (27) equal to the integral representation in (26). 
Figure 5 shows the family of solutions given by (27). We graph six different paths by setting 
A2 in (27) to positive (paths 1-3) ar,d negative (paths 5 and 6) values.  It is clear that for k < 
the spot rate can take on any value below !.  (In keeping  with the spirit of this model, we show 
in Figure 5 only paths along which the exchange rate and fundamentals strike the peg for the first 
time from below and the left: z(O) <  and k(0) 
It is easy to see that the solution to (26) must be (27) with A2  = 0.  Note first that as k 
becomes infinitely small,  the presence of the barrier  /c, has a negligible effect  on the conditional 
expectation of future levels of k in (26).  For such small k, the exchange rate should therefore be 
"Thi, translate.  into a restriction os the free parameter  A,. We conaider  only those  cases in which: 
1o,1A1  —. 
— As)r5L 
Flom  (5), the right.hand-eide  eepseeeicn  is positive. 
15 approximately linear in the fundamentals (as in the no-boundary solution,  equation (5)).  Next, 
note that (27) becomes linear in k as k —s —cc if and only if A2 = 0. 'l'hus,  equation  (26) and 
(27) can be equivalent only when A2 = 0; but setting A2 = 0 just gives solution (25), which was 
found by letting the lower bound on k go to minus infinity. Path 4 in Figure 5 thus gives the value 
of (26). 
For finite values of ,  the price-fundamentals  relationship must lie below path 4 in Figure 5. 
(This can he seen in Figure 4, where path 2 lies everywhere helow path 1.)  Figure 6 shows that a 
path such as 5 corresponds to the equilibrium fork and k0. Some  paths, such as 6, lie everywhere 
below the 45-degree line, and therefore cannot be solutions to (3) for any value of A,,.  Similarly, 
the paths that lie above 4 in Figures 4 and 5 cannot be solutions for any A,,. 
The logic of this section can of course  be applied  directly to the case of a single reflecting 
barrier  at L In that case it is straightforward to show that the exchange rate follows equation  (17) 
above, so that: 
z(t) = E(cr' J  e1''1'k(s)ds I  k(t), k(s) ￿  = k + csq 
— A11eA(k.  (28) 
3.4. Mixed Barriers 
Suppose that the authorities  expect eventually to peg the exchange rate at the depreciated 
value, ,  but  that meanwhile they will not permit arbitrarily large appreciations. They might  agree 
on a lower bound, a, at which they would intervene, selling domestic assets in order to prevent 
the exchange rate from appreciating further.  They would not, however, peg the exchange rate at 
the appreciated level, a. This is a case where it is sensible to think of  policy as providing a lower 
reflecting barrier, fr, as well as an upper absorbing barrier k,,.  Using  the techniques above, the 
solution to this more complex problem is immediate. 
With these mixed barriers, the exchange rate is given by the integral expression: 
z(t) = E(cs' J  et'l/k(s)ds  I  k(t),k(s)  Ikr,L]).  (29) 
Using (8) and the boundary  conditions (12) and (21), we have the proposition: 
16 Proposition  3. When fundamentals follow (2) between a reflecting  barrier  arid an absorbing 
barrier k, the saddlepath solution (29)  is: 
— o  A2e  t4A + alet+  -  -  (30)  — .A1e' 
- 
Figure  7 shows that the paths satisfying (30) correspond to those above Path 4.  Path  2, for 
example, traces  out (30) with a lower reflecting barrier at k. Naturally, the path "pastes" at k and 
meets the upper absorbing barrier  according to (21).  A path such as I would be the equilibrium 
for a  higher reflecting barrier, while a path such as 3 would be the equilibrium for a lower one. As 
the point of intervention k —p —, the exchange rate path converges to path 4 (given  again by 
equation (25)). Paths such as 5 and 6 cannot satisfy these boundary conditions, since along them 
G'(k) is strictly positive at all k > . 
3.5. More Complex Forcing Processes 
The techniques above are practical only when the driving process in (2) is relatively simple; it 
is usually impossible to find closed-form general solutions to the analogues of (7) when k follows a 
more complicated forcing process. Nonetheless, some special cases do have solutions. Suppose, for 
example, that fundamentals are mean reverting: 
dk(t) = (t — Ok(t))dt +  odz(t),  (31) 
where s, 0  and  are known constants.  Use of (1) and application of Ltd's lemma lead to the 
differential equation: 
G(k) = k + (t 
—  Gk)G'(k) + -G"(k).  (32) 
The  following  proposition gives the general solution to (32): 
Proposition  4. When fundamentals follow  (31),  any solution to equation (1) must satisfy: 
=  G(k) = .±!L  + A1M(, ,  2(rl_Ok)z) + A2M(j-,  (33) 
17 where  'ti and  A2 are arbitrary constants and M(  ) is the confluent hypergeoinetric function.'4 
Using the procedures discussed above, it is straightforward to rederive all the above proposi- 
tions when fundamentals evolve according to (31). Naturally, for values of Jr such that  Ok  q the 
mean-reversion component of (31) is unimportant,  so that the solutions appear qualitatively very 
similar to those shown in the graphs. For values of Jr where mean reversion is important, the mean 
reversion introduces a new source of bending (toward the unconditional mean of k, ,j/O) into the 
paths above. 
4.  Conclusions 
This paper has shown how techniques of  regulated Brownian motion can be applied to models 
of exchange-rate determination under a variety of  possible future  regime switches. The techniques 
used above are far simpler and more intuitive than the "brute-force" method  of calculating  the 
exchange rate directly as the expected present discounted value of  fundamentals.  In particular, 
our techniques yield an explicit, closed-form  solution to the Flood and Garher (1983) example; 
and despite the complexities of solving the relevant conditional expectations directly, the answer 
derived here is surprisingly transparent.  With such solutions in hand, the next step is to turn the 
data  to determine the empirical importance of stochastic regime switches. 
i4g  Sister (sees) for the propertin  of confluent hypergeometric  functions. 
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